Mortgage Rate Intelligence & Market Updates

Current discussions regarding a bifurcated U.S. economy highlight the increasing economic divide between lower- and higher-income Americans in spending and earnings growth and wealth accumulation. While many households are doing fine and economic activity overall has been expanding at a solid pace, large segments of the population are facing high levels of economic insecurity and financial strain, and consumer sentiment on the whole has dropped to low levels. In this post, we use newly collected data from the Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE) to update our 2020 analysis of disproportionate financial hardship experienced during the early pandemic and to investigate recent changes in food insecurity and broader economic strains. We then examine how food insecurity relates to the increase in consumer pessimism. We find a remarkable increase in food insecurity, particularly among lower-educated and lower-income households and households with young children. We document a contemporaneous increase in pessimism among the same groups, along with a sharp decline in job-finding expectations.

Economists often look at nominal wage growth to gauge labor market imbalances, price pressures, and households’ spending ability. But to use wage growth for these purposes, it is important to look through short-run fluctuations and retrieve underlying wage inflation. In this post, we use our own measure of wage growth persistence—called Trend Wage Inflation (TWIn in short)—to summarize what we learned from wage growth behavior in the past years and draw conclusions for what may lie ahead. Since peaking in late 2021, TWIn has been on a steady decline, reaching levels near those of the 2017-19 period. In the past few months, however, this decline seems to have lost momentum. Our analysis shows that most of the decline in TWIn between 2022 and 2025 was common across industries. Recently, however, a few sectors have shown a decoupling of wage growth dynamics.

In the third quarter of 2025, America’s largest tech firms for the first time spent more on capital investment than they earned from operations. The implication is that AI, a technology with the potential to make the economy more productive, is, for now, absorbing resources faster than it is generating returns. This post discusses how the tension between AI’s long-run promise and its short-run costs affects the outlooks for inflation, real activity, and financial stability.

The global corporate nonfinancial bond market is both a large investment asset class and a vital source of funding for nonfinancial firms. With $19 trillion outstanding at the end of 2024, a broad portfolio of corporate bonds would be expected to be well diversified. Yet, in 37 percent of months between 1998 and 2024, more than 80 percent of bonds in the ICE Global Bond Indices—a portfolio with over 10,000 constituents spanning diverse industries, credit ratings, and regions—moved in the same direction, suggesting a large degree of synchronization. In this post, we introduce the global credit factor, which proxies for the global price of risk in international corporate bond markets. The global credit factor creates a global credit cycle in bond risk premia and generates predictable comovement in bond prices.

Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets are immense, with official estimates putting their current market value at $69 trillion. U.S. holdings of foreign assets are also impressive but much smaller, at $41 trillion. The shortfall in U.S. foreign assets relative to foreign liabilities has been mounting for decades. Yet U.S. investment income receipts—in profits, dividends, and interest—comfortably exceeded income payments until recently. We show that the fading of the net investment income surplus stems from the upward shift in interest rates in the aftermath of the pandemic along with the continued net sales of U.S. assets to foreign investors.

As generative AI tools become more widely used, a key issue is the technology’s impact on labor demand. Where might we find evidence of that impact? In this post, we examine whether early evidence of AI’s effect on the labor market appears in firms’ job postings. We combine an occupational measure of AI exposure with detailed U.S. job-posting data from Lightcast, which aggregates listings from company career pages, national and local job boards, and job-listing aggregators. Using this data, we test whether postings for AI-exposed occupations declined disproportionately since the release of ChatGPT in late 2022. We find that, while overall hiring has slowed since then, the evidence from job postings provides little indication of a distinct AI-driven decline in labor demand.

During 2026:Q1, household debt balances increased slightly, by $18 billion, to reach $18.8 trillion, according to the latest Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit from the New York Fed’s Center for Microeconomic Data. Amid upticks in mortgage, HELOC, and auto balances and a seasonal decline in credit card balances, student loan balances remained unchanged. However, the share of student loan balances past due increased, nearing pre-pandemic levels at just over 10 percent. In this post, we focus on which borrowers entered default on their federal student loans over the past two quarters. We find that the average borrower entering default is nearly 40 years old, was not past due on their student loans prior to the pandemic, and is more likely to live in the South. While defaulted borrowers are more likely to be past due on other forms of debt, the overall scope of student loan defaults is still relatively low, suggesting that fears of broader contagion to other credit products are premature.

The conflict in the Middle East has precipitated a global supply shock—the third in six years following the pandemic in 2020 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The current shock raises the specter of spillovers to the U.S. through both prices and physical shortages of goods. A critical conduit for spillovers through these channels is via Asian supply chains, especially from middle- to lower-middle income countries in southeast Asia, which are key suppliers for goods needed for the AI infrastructure build-out in the U.S. These countries are also heavily reliant on Middle East energy imports. This post examines key factors related to these Asian supply chain vulnerabilities.

Do the recent stresses in the NBFI space—notably the bankruptcies of Tricolor and First Brands, and the decision of Blue Owl Capital Corp II (OBDC II) to end its redemption program and return capital through a wind-down of the fund—create distress for banks? The general sentiment is that the recent stresses are unlikely to amount to systemic concerns, although it does not mean there might not be “some stress and strain” for banks and that policymakers are “watching carefully” for exposure across banks. In a series of previous posts, we showed that shocks to nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) directly impact banks that have exposures to NBFIs. In this post, we show that bank stocks have been directly impacted by NBFIs yet again. In short, NBFI troubles do result in “stress and strain” for banks.